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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
SHAYNE M. HANSEN,
Defendant/Respondent.

CaseNo.20010100-SC
Priority No. 13

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND OPINION BELOW
This Court granted the state's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals in State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353.17P.3d 1135. The court of appeals'decision
in Hansen is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (1996); and as set forth in State v. South.
924 P.2d 354, 355-57 (Utah 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
A. Whether the court of appeals' ruling in State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, should
be affirmed since the totality of the circumstances failed to support consent to search.
B. Whether the "consent" and resulting seizure were invalid where they were
poisoned by a prior police illegality.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court adopts the same standard of
review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and
findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. State v. Lewa. 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah
1997) (cite omitted). The court of appeals reviewed the issues on appeal in this case using
a bifurcated standard: n[T]he trial court's ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or
involuntary is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah
1993). However, f[T]he trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless
they are found to be clearly erroneous.' Id" Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^7.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provision will be determinative of the questions presented for review:
U.S. Const, amend. IV. The text of that provision is contained in the attached Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
On February 18, 1999, the state filed an Information against Hansen for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). (R.2-3.) On July 2,1999, Hansen
filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search. (R. 23-25.) After
an evidentiary hearing (R. 49; 84), the trial juge denied the motion. (R. 69.) A copy of the
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum C
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(hereinafter "Findings" and/or "Conclusions").
On August 20, 1999, Hansen entered into a conditional guilty plea, wherein he pled
guilty to unlawful possession/use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony offense.
The trial court dismissed the charge for drug paraphernalia and Hansen specifically
"retain[ed] his right to appeal" the trial court's "denial of his motion to suppress," pursuant
to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). (R. 55; see also 58.) Thereafter, Hansen
appealed. On December 14, 2000, the court of appeals issued an opinion reversing the trial
court's ruling on the matter. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353. This Court granted the state's
petition for a writ of certiorari review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 11, 1998, Officer Huntington was driving behind Hansen. As
Huntington initiated a computer check on Hansen's car, he observed Hansen make "an
improper lane change." (R. 84:6-12.) Also, the computer check revealed that Hansen's car
was uninsured. (R. 84:10.) Huntington initiated a traffic stop and pulled behind Hansen in
a convenience store parking lot. (R. 84:10-11.) Huntington's emergency lights were
activated. (Id); Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, %2.
"Officer Huntington, dressed in uniform and carrying a sidearm, exited his patrol car
and confronted Hansen." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J3; (R. 84:8,11,19). Huntington told
Hansen he had been stopped for "improper lane change" and lack of insurance. (R.84:12.)
Hansen told Officer Huntington that he did not have insurance "because he could not afford

3

it." (R. 84:12-13.) Huntington then requested Hansen's license and registration and returned
to his patrol car to run a computer check. The check revealed a valid license and no
outstanding warrants for arrest. (R. 84:13); Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, Tf3.
As Officer Huntington returned to Defendant Hansen's car, the encounter intensified:
a second officer pulled behind Hansen, activated his emergency lights, and stepped out of
his patrol car. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, ^[3; (R. 84:14, 36-37).
Huntington returned the license and registration to Hansen and informed him to obtain
insurance for the car. Huntington intended to give Hansen a warning for the "improper lane
change" (R. 84:16-17), but did not recall saying anything about the matter. (R. 84:32-34,3536, 43-45.) Instead, without any break in the conversation and without any discussion
concerning the lane change, Huntington asked Hansen if he had alcohol, weapons, or drugs
in the vehicle. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J4; (R- 84:16-17, 37-38). Hansen answered,
"no." Huntington then asked, "Do you mind if I check?" Hansen answered, "yes." Hansen,
2000 UT App 353, Tf4; (R. 84:17-18, 38-40).
Thereafter, Huntington told Hansen and his passenger to step out of the car and to
stand next to the second officer. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, %5 (R. 84:19-20). Hansen and
the passenger complied. Huntington conducted a search and found a billy club and a
marijuana pipe on the floor of the driver's area of Hansen's car. (R. 84:20-21.) Officer
Huntington asked "whose marijuana pipe it was" and Hansen said it was his. (R. 84:21.)
The officer arrested Hansen and searched him incident thereto, locating a substance that he
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believed to be methamphetamine. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^[5; (R. 84:22).
During proceedings in the trial court, Hansen moved to suppress the evidence seized
during the warrantless search. (R. 23-25, 84). The trial court denied the motion. (R. 69.)
Hansen appealed. The court of appeals reversed the matter on the grounds that the state
failed to establish consent. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353.
Hansen also argued on appeal that the "consent" and seizure of evidence were
poisoned by a prior illegality. See id. at ^[25, n.9. This Court may consider that issue on
review as an alternative basis for affirming the court of appeals1 ruling. South, 924 P.2d at
355-57. Additional facts relating to this matter are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court upheld Officer Huntington's warrantless search in this case on the basis
that Hansen gave valid consent. A search following consent is lawful if (1) the consent was
voluntarily given, and (2) it was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality.
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. In this case, the trial court erred in its determination; the
"consent" was unlawful under both prongs of the Thurman analysis.
Specifically, with respect to the first prong, Huntington testified that he requested
consent to search by asking Hansen, "Do you mind if I check [the car for alcohol, weapons,
or drugs]." According to the officer, Hansen said "yes." The officer's testimony of the
matter failed to support consent. Thereafter, the officer testified in a conclusory fashion that
he had consent to search and he assumed he had consent. According to the law, conclusory
statements will not support a search under the Fourth Amendment. Also, an officer's
5

impressions/assumptions are irrelevant to the analysis. The court of appeals ruled the
evidence was insufficient for consent. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353. That ruling was correct.
The state takes issue with the court of appeals' ruling because the court cited to a
'"presumption against waiver' standard" inStatev.Ham.910 P.2d 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
The court of appeals' reference to that standard constitutes dictum in the context of Hansen's
case, and it is irrelevant. Indeed, this Court rejected the '"presumption against waiver'
standard" in State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^44-47,435 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. Hansen has relied
on Bisner in the analysis in this case. This Court's ruling in Bisner does not change the result
in Hansen. 2000 UT App 353. The court of appeals' ruling should be upheld.
Next, even if this Court determined that consent was voluntary under the first prong
of the Thurman analysis, the consent was invalid where it was obtained by police
exploitation of a prior illegality. Officer Huntington unlawfully exceeded the scope of the
justification for the stop in this case in order to engage in an investigatory search of Hansen's
car. The unlawful investigation and detention poisoned "consent."
The state disagrees and claims that when Officer Huntington obtained "consent" to
search the car, Hansen was free to go. The state ignores the facts in evidence. When Officer
Huntington obtained "consent," the matter was escalating: Hansen remained detained. The
court of appeals correctly ruled that Officer Huntington unlawfully continued the detention
and the investigation in order to search the car. On that basis, the officer's prior conduct
poisoned the consent and seizure of evidence. The warrantless search may not be upheld.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE RECORD IN THIS CASE FAILS TO SUPPORT CONSENT.
The state claims the court of appeals applied an incorrect analysis to the consent issue
in this case. Yet, the court of appeals looked to the "totality of the circumstances" to find that
the evidence failed to support consent. See infra. Points LA. and C, herein.
The court of appeals also cited to a '"presumption against waiver' standard" that has
been rejected by this Court. The court of appeals' reference to the "presumption" standard
was incorrect, but otherwise inconsequential. That is, rejecting the '"presumption against
waiver' standard" does not change the result in this case. See infra, Point I.B., herein.
Also, the state claims the court of appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial
court's findings relating to consent. The state has failed in its analysis to identify any
findings that were not given deference, and it has failed to identify how the court of appeals'
review of those findings was incorrect. On that basis, the state's argument must fail.
A. THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" ANALYSIS APPLIES IN
CONSIDERING "CONSENT" UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. THE
COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" ANALYSIS IN HANSEN.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV. Unless a governmental agency has secured a valid warrant to
conduct a search, the search is presumptively unlawful, "subject only to a few specifically
7

established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. U.S.. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see
State v.Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).
One of the "recognized exception[s]ff to the warrant requirement is consent. Brown.
853 P.2d at 855; State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, Tf43; State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684,687 (Utah
1990); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1992).
In considering consent, this Court has consistently followed U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. It has considered the totality of the circumstances and it has looked to whether
consent was obtained "as rthe product of duress or coercion, express or implied/" Bisner,
2001 UT 99, Tf47 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)); see also.
State v.Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196,1206 (Utah 1995); State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103,106
(Utah 1980). This Court also has ruled that consent must be voluntary, and it may not be
obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, T}43 (citing
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262).
In the underlying opinion to this case, the court of appeals relied on the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis identified above. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, <fll 8 ("In determining
whether consent was voluntarily given we will look to the 'totality of all the circumstances'")
(citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227). The court of appeals also relied on the two-part test
articulated in Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262. See Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, f7 n.5 & 1J18
("[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given
voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior
8

illegality") (citing Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262; State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah
1990)). Those standards support the court of appeals' ruling in this case that "consent" was
invalid, as further discussed below. See infra. Point I.C., herein.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS REFERRED TO LANGUAGE IN STATE v.
HAM THAT THIS COURT IN BISNER HAS SPECIFICALLY REJECTED.
THAT IS NOT FATAL TO THE RESULT IN HANSEN'S CASE SINCE THE
COURT OF APPEALS' REFERENCE TO HAM IS DICTUM.
In addition to applying the "totality of the circumstances" analysis to the consent
issue, the court of appeals in Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, also quoted from State v. Ham, 910
P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996). It stated the following:
This court has adopted the following analytical framework to determine whether the
State has met its burden of proving that consent was voluntarily given:
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal and
specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the government must prove consent
was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating
these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against the
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence
that such rights were waived."
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, Tfl8 (citing Ham, 910 P.2d at 439).
This Court in Bisner has since rejected portions of the court of appeals' "analytical
framework" identified above. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, Tflf44-47. That does not change the court
of appeals1 result in Hansen for two reasons.
First, in ruling that consent was invalid, the court of appeals did not rely on those
portions of Ham that have been rejected. Thus, the state's arguments concerning Ham are
irrelevant.

See infra. Points I.B.I, and I.B.2. Second, under the "totality of the cir-

cumstances" analysis, the record in this case fails to support consent. On that basis, the court
9

of appeals' ruling must be affirmed. See infra. Point I.C.
1. While the Court of Appeals1 Analysis Set Forth in State v. Ham Is Incorrect in Part,
It Is Also Irrelevant: In Hansen, the Reference to Ham Constitutes Dictum.
In this case, the court of appeals quoted from Ham, 910 P.2d at 439, as follows: "[we]
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived." Hansen, 2000
UT App 353, ^[18 (emphasis added) (citing Ham). The state refers to the emphasized
language above as the "'presumption against waiver1 standard." (State's Brief of Petitioner,
at 15-16.) According to the state, the court of appeals' reference to the "presumption"
standard renders Hansen invalid. The state's claims are incorrect.
Specifically, the '"presumption against waiver' standard" has been construed to mean
that in order for consent to be valid, the state first must establish that the "consenting party
affirmatively waived [his] constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures."
See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, Tf44 (emphasis added). That is, as a necessary prerequisite to the
consent determination, the state would be required to show that the officer provided Mirandatype warnings1 and obtained a "knowing and intelligent waiver" from the defendant under
the Fourth Amendment. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235. In Schneckloth, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the use of such warnings and the "presumption" standard as
it stood for that proposition. Id at 242-44.
The Utah Court of Appeals likewise has rejected the proposition that an officer must

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10

first obtain a "knowing and intelligent waiver" with Miranda-type warnings in order for
consent to be valid. State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111-12 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied,
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) ("In SchnecklothfJ. the United States Supreme Court expressly
rejected the proposition that the Fourth Amendment requires an enforcement officer to
inform a person of his or her right to refuse consent to search.... This interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment has been continuously applied in Utah". . . "JWJe decline to interpret
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution as requiring a knowing consent") (citing
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106; State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App.1993); State v.
Carter, 812 P.2d 460,468 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); State
v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah App.1991); and State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437
(Utah App. 1990)); see also State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah App. 1995)
^Defendant contends that his wife's consent was not voluntary because she was unaware of
her right to refuse consent. He argues that, on the strength of Article I, section 14, of the
Utah Constitution, we should mandate Miranda-type disclosures about one's rights when
police ask for permission to conduct a search"... "We recently rejected this contention and
held that proving voluntary consent under the Utah Constitution, as well as its federal
counterpart, does not include proving that the defendant knew of his or her right to refuse
to consent to a search") (cites omitted).
Thus, while the Utah Court of Appeals has complied with Schneckloth and rejected
the "'presumption against waiver1 standard" in cases where the issue of a "knowing and
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intelligent waiver" has been raised and discussed on appeal, the court of appeals nevertheless has continued to refer to the "presumption" standard in its "analytical framework"
for consent. See Ham, 910 P.2d at 439; see also State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887-88
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).2 That reference is confusing.
This Court specifically has rejected the court of appeals' references to the
"presumption" standard. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, T[44-47. That is appropriate.
Inasmuch as Hansen's case does not hinge on "the proposition that the Fourth
Amendment requires an enforcement officer to inform a person of his or her right to refuse
consent to search," see Contrel 886 P.2d at 111, and it does not hinge on the "'presumption
against waiver' standard," it is inconsequential that the court of appeals in State v. Hansen

2

The Supreme Court in Schneckloth recognized that '"[wjaiver' is a vague term used for
a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235. To that
end, it may be argued that in those cases where the Utah Court of Appeals simply made
reference to the '"presumption against waiver' standard," it was not citing to the standard for
any improper or "bad" purpose. That is, the court of appeals was not suggesting officers first
had to obtain a "knowing and intelligent waiver" to support consent. See Contrel 886 P.2d
at 111 (specifically rejecting the "knowing and intelligent waiver" standard).
By way of explanation, the "waiver" doctrine identified by the court of appeals may
be interpreted as follows: The U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have reiterated time and
again that searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment —
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993); Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. In that regard, unless the
state has established the application of a well-delineated exception, there is a "presumption
against" the validity of the warrantless search, /. e. the search is "per se unreasonable." That
is proper in the law. Under that interpretation, the court of appeals may have been using the
"presumption" language for a "good" purpose.
Although the court of appeals likely had "good" intentions, the "presumption"
language is somewhat confusing. In that regard, the better approach is to discontinue
reference to the "presumption." See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, TJ47.
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made reference to the "presumption" standard. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99,1J47 ("[T]o the
degree [the court of appeals' analysis] hinges consent upon waiver — and to the extent our
prior cases have not made our position perfectly clear- we today explicitly reject the court
of appeals1 voluntariness test as enunciated in Marshall and its progeny").
That is, in Hansen's case, the court of appeals' reference to the "presumption"
standard was harmless. The standard was irrelevant to the appeal issue and to the final
determination in the case. Hansen did not rely on the "presumption" in demonstrating the
illegality of the search. He did not claim that in order for the state to establish consent, it
must show that he was informed of his constitutional rights against an unreasonable search,
or that he "knowingly and intelligently waived" those rights.
Thus, the reference to the "presumption" in the underlying opinion to this case
constituted dictum.

It was not controlling and it carried little persuasive authority.

See McGoldrickv. Walker. 838 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1992).
Finally, the state has failed to explain how rejection of the '"presumption against
waiver' standard" would change the analysis in this case. (See. State's Brief of Petitioner in
general.) On that basis, its claims must be rejected on review.
2. The State Has Attacked the First Prong Under State v. Ham on the Basis That It
Is "Founded" in the '"Presumption Against Waiver' Standard." The State's Argument
Is Irrelevant.
In its brief on certiorari, the state also seems to attack the "first prong" of the court
of appeals' "analytical framework" in Ham. (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 16-19.) The
"first prong" concerns the following: "[To determine whether the State has met its burden
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of proving that consent was voluntary] (1) There must be clear and positive testimony that
the consent was 'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given.'" Hansen.
2000 UT App 353,1(18 (citing Ham, 910 P.2d at 439).
The state claims that under that prong, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
"any consent must be 'freely' given" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 16), but has rejected the
notion that consent must be "intelligent" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 16-17 (citing
Schneckloth. 412 U.S. at 234-35)); and the court of appeals' "requirement of clear and
positive testimony simply employs [the] presumption against waiver requirement." (State's
Brief of Petitioner at 17.)
The state does not take issue with the court of appeals' use of the language "unequivocal and specific" in the "first prong." In fact, the state asserts that language "simply
requires the State to make the threshold showing that consent was in fact given and that the
search was within the scope of the consent." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 18.)
In response to the state's complaints regarding the "first prong," Hansen maintains the
state has misread the court of appeals' ruling in Hansen, and misapplied Schneckloth. In
addition, the state's complaints are irrelevant. In this case, Bisner governs.
By way of explanation, in Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, the court of appeals looked to
whether consent was "freely and intelligently given" to assess "duress and coercion." Id. at
T|22 (the phrase "freely and intelligently" relates to whether consent was obtained without
duress or coercion, express or implied). Duress and coercion are relevant to the analysis
under Bisner. See Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^47 (consent is not voluntary if it is obtained with
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duress and coercion, express or implied).

This Court in Bisner, stated that the test

articulated in Ham and Marshall "correctly requires absence of duress or coercion for
consent to be deemed voluntary." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f44. Thus, read in context, that
language is appropriate.3
As for the phrase "clear and positive testimony," it is another way of saying the state
must prove consent with "substantial, competent evidence" on the matter. Bisner, 2001 UT
99, ^[42 (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687). The state must establish "that consent was in fact
given and that the search was within the scope of the consent." (State's Brief of Petitioner
at 18 (state does not take issue with court of appeals' language that evidence must support
"unequivocal and specific" consent)); see Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^[21 (court of appeals
determined whether consent was in fact given by assessing whether there was "clear and
positive" testimony that "Hansen's response was unequivocal and specific").
The phrase should not be construed to mean anything more than what is set forth in
Bisner. In addition, the phrase does not impose a greater burden on the prosecution than that
which already exists.

(See State's Brief of Petitioner at 17-18 (state recognizes

3

The state claims Schneckloth rejected the use of the term "intelligently" in assessing
consent. Yet, in that case, the Supreme Court addressed a "narrow" question: whether the
government must provide evidence of a "knowing and intelligent waiver " to obtain a valid
consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234-35; 248. The Court in Schneckloth did not discuss
the issue of "intelligent" consent.
Also, the phrase "freely and intelligently" as used in Hansen should not be
misconstrued. Specifically, Hansen did not claim that for consent to be valid the state must
establish he was educated or of high intelligence. Hansen likewise did not argue that
"consent" must be intelligent in that it must be "informed" or "knowing." In the context of
this case, the phrase "freely and intelligently" related to the absence of duress or coercion.
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^[22. Thus, the state's claims on review are irrelevant.
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preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, then asserts that "[t]o the extent the requirement
of'clear and positive testimony' requires something more, it is error").) The court of appeals
has specifically recognized the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in suppression
hearings and has not required more. See State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ^f 17,434 Utah
Adv. Rep. 31; State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525, 533 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); GenovesL 909 P.2d
at 923 n. 8. The state's suggestions to the contrary are irrelevant.
Whether this Court accepts or rejects the "first prong" set forth in Ham and Marshall
is of no consequence. When the brush is cleared, the state's arguments are irrelevant. In this
case, the record fails to contain "substantial, competent evidence" to support consent under
the totality of the circumstances. Under the standard articulated in Bisner and Thurman, the
court of appeals reached the correct result, as further set forth below.
C. UNDER THE "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" ANALYSIS.
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH CONSENT IN THIS CASE.
In Bisner, this Court ruled that the issue of consent must be supported by "substantial,
competent evidence." Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^[42. "Substantial, competent evidence" consists
of "the empirical, such as things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or
taking place, as well as the subjective, such as state of mind." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935; (see
State's Brief at 18 (acknowledging that "consent" must be unequivocal and specific)).
The substantial, competent evidence must furnish the basis for the trial court's factual
findings. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, TJ42. Also, "[t]he findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' The findings
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'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" State v. Real Property at
633 East 640 North. Orem, 924 P.2d 925,931 (Utah 1997) (cite omitted). It stands to reason
that if the findings must be sufficiently detailed and articulated, the evidence supporting the
findings must be likewise. (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 18 (consent must be unequivocal
and specific).)
In this case, the court of appeals determined the findings were deficient. See Hansen.
2000 UT App 353. The officer's testimony concerning the "events, actions, or conditions
happening, existing, or taking place," Pena. 869 P.2d at 935, failed to support consent.
The state disagrees with that ruling. It claims the court of appeals failed to give
proper deference to the trial court's finding of fact "that defendant consented to the search."
(State's Brief of Petitioner at 22.)
The state's argument is incorrect as a matter of law since "consent" is a legal
conclusion, see Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^42 (consent is a question of law),4 and it is incorrect

4

The state has dedicated relevant portions of its argument to the proposition that
"consent" is a "factual finding." (See State's Brief of Petitioner at 19-27.) That is incorrect,
as this Court specified in Bisner: "The question of whether a party has consented to a search
is a question of law, and we therefore review it for correctness." Bisner. 2001 UT 99, TJ42;
see Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1271 (ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or
involuntary is a question of law); State v. $175.800. 942 P.2d 343, 346 (Utah 1997)
("Whether consent is an exception to a warrantless seizure is a question of law to be
reviewed for correctness"); State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
The state advanced the same, incorrect proposition in the court of appeals. (See
State's Brief of Appellee, dated June 19, 2000, at pp. 15-18.) As a result, when that court
reversed the trial court's ruling on consent, it also stated, "To the extent its determination
17

in the context of this case. Here, the trial court did not "find" consent. Rather, the trial court
"concluded" consent. (See R. 68, «|8; a copy of the trial court's Findings and Conclusions is
attached hereto as Addendum C.)
Also, the state's argument is deficient. The state has failed in its brief to identify any
11

finding of fact" on consent that should have been sustained.5 (See State's Brief of Petitioner

in general.) Indeed, the state has failed to mention any trial court "Finding" whatsoever in
its argument. (See State's Brief of Petitioner in general; see also R. 63-39 ("Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law").)
Next, the state claims the evidence of record supports consent. The evidence reflects
the following:
[PROSECUTOR:] And when you asked him for consent, do you recall now exactly
how you phrased that?
[HUNTINGTON:] It's my practice to ask them for consent by stating, Do you have
any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle? And if they say no, I say, Well, do you
mind if I check?
Q. Do you recall Mr. Hansen responding to your question[s]?

amounted to a finding of fact, it was clearly erroneous." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^21.
That language does not support that the court of appeals was "uncertain as to the
appropriate standard of appellate review," as the state claims here. (See State's Brief of
Petitioner at 20.) Rather, the court of appeals simply was responding to the state's incorrect
assertion that consent is a "factual finding."
5

To be clear, the state is not claiming that Hansen somehow failed in the court of appeals
to properly challenge the relevant findings or to marshal the evidence. Indeed, the state has
no claim where that is concerned. (See Hansen's Brief of Appellant, dated April 18, 2000,
at 13-18; Hansen's Reply Brief of Appellant, dated August 18, 2000, at 9-10.)
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A. He did give me consent.
Q. Well first, with respect to the question as to whether he had those items in his car.
A. No. He said no.
Q. He said no.
THE COURT: And the query again, Officer, was, Do you have any THE WITNESS: Alcohol, drugs or weapons.
[PROSECUTOR RESUMING]
Q. To which Mr. Hansen said no?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then you asked, Do you mind [if] I check?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And what was his response to that question?
A. He said yes.
[JUDGE LEWIS]: Yes, he minded?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I could have consent to search.
*

*

*

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you then indicated that you asked him if you could
search the vehicle?
A. I did.
Q. Do you recall specifically what you said to him.
A. Not specifically.
Q. Do you have any idea?
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A. I would imagine I stated: Do you have any alcohol, drugs or weapons in the
vehicle?
Q. He said no?
A. He said no. Do you mind if I check?
Q. Okay.
A. And then he said yes.
[JUDGE LEWIS]: He said?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He [said] yes.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
[JUDGE LEWIS]: Do you mind if I check and he said yes?
THE WITNESS: Well, do you mind if I check, and then yes, he gave me consent.
Sorry.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: (Resuming)
Q. So you said he gave you consent?
A. Yes, he did give me consent.
Q. What did he say?
A. What?
Q. What did he say?
A. What did he say?
Q. Yeah.
A. I don't recall exactly other than it was consent.
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Q. So you don't recall his exact words?
A. Not exactly.
Q. So are you assuming that he said yes?
A. I assume that he said yes.
Q. That's what you're doing today?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. That's what you're doing today?
A. That's what I'm doing today?
Q. Yes, in terms of his response.
A. I assume that he said yes.
Q. Nothing more than that?
A. He probably could have said yes, go ahead.
Q. But you don't recall him saying that?
A. I don't recall.
*

*

*

[PROSECUTOR]: Now, Officer Huntington, when you say the defendant gave his
consent for you to check inside his vehicle, was it verbal.
A. It was verbal.
Q. Is it you just don't recall what the exact words were?
A. I don't recall the exact wording.
(R. 84:17^18,38-40,43).
In sum, the officer testified to the basic substance of his conversation with Hansen.
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The officer asked, "Do you mind if I [search your car]?" and Hansen answered, "yes." (R.
84:17-18, 38-40.) The officer's testimony of the facts and circumstances failed to support
consent. (See R. 84:18, 39-40); Hansen. 2000 UT App 353.
In its brief, the state claims that "Officer Huntington clarified that defendant
responded, 'Yes, I could have consent to search."' (State's Brief of Petitioner at 23 (emphasis
added).) That claim disregards the evidence of record and misrepresents the matter.
According to the record, when Huntington was given the opportunity to clarify or
explain the circumstances supporting consent, he failed to do so. (R. 84:38-40.) Huntington
was either unable or unwilling to provide substantial, competent evidence of consent. (R.
84:38-40, 43.) Indeed, in clarifying the matter, Huntington specifically did not recall that
Hansen responded "yes, go ahead" for consent (R. 84:40), or anything to that effect. (R.
84:38-40.) Huntington simply assumed he had consentto search (R. 84:40), and he admitted
to the prosecutor that he could not recall what was said, other than it was verbal. (Compare
R. 84:43 (Huntington could not recall what was said), with State's Brief of Petitioner at 23
(state claims "defendant responded 'yes, I could have consent to search'").)
The substantial, competent evidence fails to support consent, as explained below.
1. The Conclusorv Statements Relating to "Consent" Are Insufficient Under the Law.
Under the totality of the circumstances analysis, conclusory statements are insufficient
to support a search under the Fourth Amendment. Conclusory statements do not constitute
substantial, competent evidence of the circumstances surrounding the matter. See Black's
Law Dictionary at 284 (7th ed. 1999) (a "conclusory" statement is a "factual inference" that
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does not include "the underlying facts on which the inference is based").
To explain, in this case the state was required to establish "consent" by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Brown, 853 P.2d at 855 (the state bears the burden of
proving consent at a motion to suppress hearing by a preponderance of the evidence). This
Court has ruled that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is greater even than the
probable-cause standard. See State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, If 11,20 P.3d 300. Under the lesser
probable-cause standard, the United States Supreme Court, this Court and the Utah Court
of Appeals have consistently ruled that conclusory statements will not justify an officer's
search under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,239 (1983) (applying
the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, a judge must be presented with sufficient,
specific facts to issue a search warrant, otherwise, the judge's ruling will consist of "a mere
ratification of the bare conclusions of others"); see. id_ at 234 (recognizing that
"preponderance of the evidence" standard is more finely-tuned than the "probable cause"
standard); State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989) (in the context of the warrant
requirement under the lesser, probable-cause standard, an officer's conclusory statements are
insufficient); see also State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(conclusory statements are insufficient).
Here, Huntington's testimony was conclusory, where he stated, "[Hansen] did give
me consent"; "Yes, I could have consent to search"; "He gave me consent"; and "Yes, he did
give me consent." (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.) When counsel asked Huntington to describe
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generally the circumstances supporting those conclusory statements,6 Huntington refused and
failed to do so, relying on his conclusory impressions of the matter. (Id.)
In this case, the conclusory statements were insufficient to support consent.
2. Huntington's Testimony Concerning "Consent" Reflects His Impressions of the
Matter. His Impressions Are Irrelevant.
Next, Huntington's statements supporting "consent" consist only of his impressions
or assumptions. Huntington's impressions fail to include the "things, events, actions, or
conditions happening, existing, or taking place," Pena, 869 P.2d at 935, under the total
circumstances. Thus, under the law they are irrelevant. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,
1136-37 (Utah 1994) (an officer's state of mind is irrelevant); State v. Patefield 927 P.2d
655, 659 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Barnes, 978 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Wash. App. 1999)
(officer's belief is immaterial); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996).
3. The "Substantial Competent Evidence" Fails to Support "Consent."

6

As set forth above, the state claims the following: "Officer Huntington clarified that
defendant responded 'Yes, I could have consent to search.'" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 23.)
That claim is not supported by the record.
Specifically, according to Huntington, Hansen answered "yes," to Huntingdon's
question, "Do you mind if I check?" When counsel asked for clarification and a general
description of the circumstances supporting consent, Huntington was unable to provide such.
(R. 84:38-40 (defense counsel asked if Huntington had an "idea" how consent was obtained,
and counsel asked generally, "what did [Hansen] say?"); R. 84:43 (Huntington could not
recall what was said).) Instead, Huntington provided conclusory statements. (Id.)
Huntington also twice conceded that he assumed he had consent to search. (R. 84:40.)
When counsel asked if there was anything more, Huntington stated: "[Hansen] probably
could have said yes, go ahead," but he did not recall that Hansen made that statement. (R.
84:40.) The record reflects that Huntington either was unable or he refused to provide a
general description of the circumstances supporting consent. Either way, the state failed in
its burden of proof.
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The state apparently considers Huntington's testimony to be "contradictory"on the
issue of consent. The state seems to acknowledge that the specific facts and circumstances
fail to support consent, while Huntington's impressions "verify]" consent. (State's Brief of
Petitioner at 23.) The state also argues that the court of appeals was required to defer to the
trial court's reliance on Huntington's impressions of the matter, rather than the facts relating
to the total circumstances. (See id. at 24.) That is incorrect.
Under the law, an appellate court gives deference to the trial court's findings of fact
because of the "trial court's advantaged position in judging credibility and resolving
evidentiary conflicts." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. In this case, the trial court found Huntington to be credible. The court of appeals deferred to the trial court on that issue. See
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, Tf4 n.3 (Huntington testified with commendable candor). Also,
there were no evidentiary conflicts since Huntington was the only person to testify. While
Huntington w&s credible, his testimony was not sufficient to support consent. The testimony
did not constitute substantial, competent evidence on the matter.
Stated another way, the record does not reflect a contradiction in the facts. According to thefacts and circumstances, Huntington asked Hansen "Do you mind if I check [your
car for alcohol, drugs or weapons]?" Hansen answered unequivocally, "yes." (R. 84:17-18,
38-40.) The facts fail to support consent. Thereafter, the officer testified in a conclusory
fashion to his impressions of the matter. His impressions and conclusory statements are
irrelevant. See supra subpoint I.C.I, and I.C.2., above. The court of appeals' ruling should
be affirmed.
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4. The State Claims the Officer's Question. "Do You Mind If I Check." and Hansen's
Answer. "Yes." Support Consent. Yet. Hansen's Response Constitutes an
Unequivocal Objection to the Search.
Finally, the state argues that Huntington's testimony regarding the specific circumstances supports consent: "Common experience teaches that questions beginning with the
words, 'do you mind,' are often answered in the affirmative even though the intent is to
indicate that the speaker does not mind." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 24.) The state fails
to identify the basis for that assertion.7 Rather, it cites to cases where the witness was not
expected at trial to recall a conversation verbatim, but was asked only to give the "substance"
of the conversation. (State's Brief of Petitioner at 26-27.)

7

The state is incorrect about "common experience," since the answer "yes" to a question
that begins "do you mind" literally means the answering party objects. For example,
"Do you mind if I smoke?"
[From the 16-year-old son]: "Dad, do you mind if I take the Porsche?"
[From the 16-year-old daughter]: "Do you mind if I stay out until 3:00 a.m."
According to the state's argument, when an officer testifies that he obtained consent
by asking, "Do you mind if I search," a trial judge should be free to interpret the defendant's
affirmative response to support consent. That argument conflicts with the state's
acknowledgment that consent must be "unequivocal and specific." (State's Brief of Petitioner
at 18.) It also disregards the law, which requires the evidence to be competent and
substantial on the matter. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^|42.
In this case, the trial court did not consider the substantive evidence to support
consent. According to the record, when the officer testified that Hansen responded in the
affirmative to the question, "Do you mind if I check," the trial court interrupted the
examination and pointed out the problem with the officer's testimony. Thereafter, the trial
court disregarded the substantive evidence and relied only on the officer's unsubstantiated,
irrelevant conclusory statements and impressions to find consent.
Finally, the state's argument about "common experience" supports potentially
troubling results. Imagine a criminal defendant claiming he had "consent" to engage in
sexual activity when he specifically asked the victim, "Do you mind if I do this," and she said
"yes." In that instance, surely the state would argue that the word "yes" must be given its
plain, unambiguous, and literal meaning: the victim objected to the sexual conduct.
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In this case, Officer Huntington was not expected to recall verbatim the conversation
supporting "consent." Rather, counsel for the defense asked Officer Huntington to give only
an "idea" of the events that transpired in the matter. (R. 84:39-40 (counsel asked Huntington,
"Do you have any idea" what you said to him; and he asked, "what did [Hansen] say"
regarding consent).) Defense counsel requested a general description of the events.
Officer Huntington refused to provide a description, other than to say that he asked
Hansen, "Do you mind if I check," and Hansen answered, "yes." The officer also responded
to defense counsel's requests for general information by stating, "I don't recall exactly other
than it was consent" and he assumed he had consent. (R. 84:17-18,38-40.) Thus, the officer
declined to describe the general events supporting consent.
Next, the state has cited to Commonwealth v. BoswelL 721 A.2d336,342(Pa. 1998),
in support of the proposition that the facts in this case establish consent. (State's Brief at 27.)
In Boswell officers in plain clothes identified themselves to defendant, an airline passenger,
and asked if they could speak to her. Defendant agreed. The officers discussed defendant's
travel plans, asked to review her ticket, and then asked if a gray tweed suitcase belonged to
defendant. She answered it did. Thereafter, the officer asked "Would you mind if I take a
look inside this bag?" The officer testified that defendant answered "yes," then on crossexamination he clarified that "she said, 'Go ahead.'" Boswell 721 A.2d at 338-39.
Those circumstances do not exist in Hansen's case. Huntington twice testified that
when he asked Hansen, "Do you mind if I check," Hansen answered, "yes." When
Huntington was given the opportunity to clarify the matter, he refused to provide any
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additional facts, and instead provided conclusory testimony, stated that he did not "recall
exactly other than it was consent," and admitted he assumed he had consent. (R. 84:38-40.)
If Huntington's description of the facts, together with his conclusory statements and
impressions may be sufficient to support consent, the Fourth Amendment protections will
be rendered meaningless. For this officer — who typically seeks consent by asking "Do you
mind if I search" - it is irrelevant whether the defendant answers "yes" or "no," so long as
Huntington believes he has consent to search.

That is unacceptable.

Huntington's

impressions and conclusions cannot be sufficient to support consent under the Fourth
Amendment.
In this case, the substantial, competent evidence concerning the events and
circumstances support that Hansen provided an unambiguous, unequivocal and specific
response to the question, "Do you mind if I check": Hansen objected to the intrusion.
Huntington's conclusory statements and impressions to the contrary are irrelevant. The court
of appeals correctly determined that the facts here fail to support consent.
D. FOR POLICY REASONS. AN OFFICER'S CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS
AND ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. IF THE LAW ALLOWED
OFFICERS SIMPLY TO TESTIFY THAT THEY HAD "CONSENT" OR
"PROBABLE CAUSE" TO SUPPORT THE CONDUCT. THE STANDARD
WOULD ERODE THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
In reviewing "consent" to search on appeal, this Court is concerned with "ensuring the
consistent and uniform protection of a fundamental civil liberty," and providing statewide
standards that guide law enforcement officers and prosecutors in those functions that affect
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the rights of citizens. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. This Court also is sensitive to the need
to provide clarity to law enforcement so that it may be effective in its investigative efforts.
In order that this Court may effectively declare whether certain police conduct is
lawful or unlawful, this Court and the court of appeals must be able to consider substantial,
competent evidence on the matter. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ^[42 (considering the circumstances
of the matter to determine consent). The circumstances of a particular case, as supported by
the evidence, must justify the legal conclusion. If substantial, competent evidence is lacking,
the state has failed in its burden of proof and the conduct may not be upheld.
By way of illustration, imagine an officer who was unable to recall the circumstances
supporting his conduct, but who testified nevertheless that "Yes, I saw the item in plain
view"; or "yes, I had exigent circumstances" and "probable cause." If the law allowed a
warrantless search to be conducted based on conclusory testimony and assumptions, the
standard would render evidentiary hearings, cross examination, trial court determinations,
and appellate review meaningless. The standard essentially would allow the officer to dictate
the result in each case to the trial court, without inquiry as to whether the objective
circumstances supported the officer's impressions and without any analysis as to whether the
officer comprehended the law in reaching his conclusions about the matter. See Gates, 426
U.S. at 239 (a judge may not rely on conclusory statements, since such action would reduce
his function to a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others).
Public policy compels the need for "substantial, competent" evidence to support an
officer's conduct. Here, the trial court and court of appeals had an uncontroverted record of
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the circumstances surrounding the search. Officer Huntington testified with commendable
candor. He stated that to obtain consent, he asked if Hansen had "any alcohol, drugs or
weapons in the vehicle." (R. 84:17.) When Hansen answered "no," to the that question,
Officer Huntington asked, "Do you mind if I check." (R. 84:17-18, 38-40.)
According to Huntington, Hansen said, "yes." Both the trial court and the court of
appeals expressed concern with the testimony and both recognized it was insufficient to
support consent. (SeeR. 84:18,38-40); Hansen, 2000 UTApp 353. Thereafter, Huntington
provided only conclusory statements of his impressions. (R. 84:18, 38-40.)

When

Huntington was asked to clarify the matter and to describe the general circumstances
supporting "consent," he was unable and/or unwilling to do so. (See R. 84:38-40, 43
(Huntington admitted to the prosecutor that he could not recall what was said to obtain
consent, other than it was verbal).) Instead, Huntington testified to his assumptions and he
suggested that Hansen "probably could have said yes, go ahead," but he specifically did not
recall that Hansen made that statement. (R. 84:38-40.)
The trial court considered the conclusory statements to be sufficient to support
consent, while the court of appeals did not. The court of appeals was correct. Huntington's
testimony on the ultimate issue - without necessary detail - erodes confidence in the
evidentiary hearing. If Officer Huntington has a definition for "consent" that is not
consistent with the law, his failure to provide details to support his actions will protect his
conduct from judicial scrutiny, and his erroneous standards may never be discovered. So
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long as Huntington may be allowed to testify that consent was provided, as he did in this
case, he essentially may dictate the ruling in the matter to the trial judge.
If the law permitted conclusory statements and ambiguities to support a warrantless
search, the evidentiary standard would eviscerate constitutional protections and make
appellate review unworkable. Indeed, trial court discretion and appellate review would
consist simply of "rubber stamping" the officer's impressions and conclusions without
evidence of the "things, events, actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place."
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. Here, the conclusory statements and impressions were insufficient
to support the warrantless search. The court of appeals' ruling should be affirmed.
POINT II. THIS COURT DOES NOT NEED TO DECIDE THE EFFECTS
OF HAM ON THIS CASE, SINCE THE "CONSENT" AND SEIZURE
WERE POISONED BY A PRIOR ILLEGALITY, RENDERING THEM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE SECOND PRONG OF THE
THURMAN ANALYSIS.
A. THE CONSENT WAS OBTAINED BY POLICE EXPLOITATION OF A
PRIOR ILLEGALITY: OFFICER HUNTINGTON DETAINED HANSEN FOR
FURTHER QUESTIONING WITHOUT REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION.
Even if this Court finds voluntary consent, it still must assess whether consent was
poisoned by a prior police illegality. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262. If the state fails in its
burden of proof under either prong ofThurman, the consent is invalid. Id.
In this case, "consent" came on the heels of an unlawful, level-two detention. See
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). The unlawful detention poisoned the
consent to search the car and the resulting seizure of evidence.
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1. Huntington Continued the Detention Beyond the Permissible Scope.
To begin the analysis, this Court has identified the three levels of a police-citizen
encounter as follows:
(a) [Under the first level] an officer may approach a citizen at [any time] and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) [under the second
level] an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) [and under the third level] an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed.
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18 (citing U. S. v. Merritt. 736 F.2d 223,230 (5th Cir. 1984)); see
also Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003,1006 (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. Munsen.
821 P.2d 13, 15 n.l (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)).
The encounter in this case began as a level-two or three traffic stop. "[A] police
officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 'incident to a traffic
violation committed in the officers' presence.1" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (cites omitted);
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1992).
Such an encounter must be limited in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in thefirstplace. "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary
and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d
at 1132 (quoting Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Both "[t]he length and scope
of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry
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v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)).
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once
the driver has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the
vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to
further delay by police for additional questioning."
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446,452 (Utah 1996) (cites omitted); Lopez. 873 P.2d at 113132; State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah App. 1992).
If an officer continues to detain the occupants of a vehicle, this Court will make a
dual inquiry to determine whether continued detention was reasonable. This Court will ask,
"(1) Was the police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2) Was the resulting
detention 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in
the first place?'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1131-32 (citing Terrv. 392 U.S. at 19-20); State v.
Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see Castner. 825 P.2d at 702. If the
continued detention was not related in scope to the reason for the stop, this Court will assess
whether the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that
which justified the stop, to support continued detention and investigative questioning.
See Chapman. 921 P.2d at 453.
In this matter, "Hansen does not dispute the legality of the initial stop and the first part
of the Terry inquiry is not at issue." Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, ^(10. According to the
record and the findings, Officer Huntington stopped Hansen for an "improper lane change"
and failure to carry insurance. (R. 84:12); Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, ^3.
However, Hansen maintained in the court of appeals that the continued detention for
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further investigative questioning constituted an unlawful seizure; it exceeded the scope and
the purpose of the traffic stop. See Hansen. 2000 UT App 353,ffl[12-13;see. also State v.
Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court's determination regarding the level
of an encounter is a legal conclusion). In addition, Huntington did not articulate reasonable
suspicion of serious criminal activity to justify the continued detention. Thus, the drugrelated questioning and resulting search and seizure violated Hansen's rights.
The court of appeals agreed with Hansen. Hansen, 2000 UTApp353,^|16. It ruled
"Hansen was illegally detained" when Officer Huntington asked him questions about drugs,
alcohol, and weapons, and when Huntington "requested consent to search the car." IcL
The state takes issue with the court of appeals' ruling. It claims the matter
transformed into a level-one, consensual encounter at the point where Officer Huntington
requested "consent" to search Hansen's car. "In short, Officer Huntington's verbal warning
that defendant needed to obtain insurance and his return of defendant's registration and
driver's license signaled the end of the detention such that a reasonable person would feel
free to leave." According to the state, Hansen was no longer detained when he provided
"consent"; he was free to go on about his business. (State's Brief of Petitioner at 37.) The
state is incorrect, as explained below.
2. The State Claims the Encounter Transformed from a Level-Two to a Level-One
Encounter. The Objective Facts Fail to Support the State's Claim.
In considering whether an encounter has diminished in intensity from a level-two
detention to a level-one consensual encounter, this Court will review the objective facts from
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the perspective of a reasonable person.

This Court will assess whether the officer

communicated through words or the import of the situation that defendant was free to go.
See State v. Higgins. 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994); Johnson. 805 P.2d at 763 (court
looks to objective facts to determine if person would believe she was free to go); Patefield.
927 P.2d at 659; State v. Robinette. 685 N.E.2d 762, 770 (Ohio 1997). For example, did
the officer indicate to detainee that he was finished with his business as it related to the
justification for the stop, either by issuing a citation/warning, or through some other action?
(See State's Brief at 36 (the issuance of a warning may signal the end of the detention).)
Also, this Court will not consider the officer's subjective belief regarding the situation.
If the officer had an uncommunicated belief that defendant was free to leave, that is
irrelevant to the analysis. See Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1136-37 (an officer's state of mind is
irrelevant); Patefield. 927 P.2d at 659; Barnes. 978 P.2d at 1135 (officer's subjective belief
that defendant was free to walk away was immaterial); see also Robinette. 519 U.S. at 38.
In this case, the court of appeals correctly determined that while Officer Huntington
believed he had finished his business with Hansen when he requested "consent" to search
(R. 84:16-17), the officer did not communicate that belief to Hansen, and the objective facts
surrounding the matter were such that the reasonable person would not feel free to leave.
The totality of the circumstances supported continued detention. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353,
1112-17.
Specifically, Huntington testified that when he requested "consent" to search, Hansen
was free to go. Yet, at that point, the officer had not completed his business as it related to
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the stop. Huntington had failed to indicate to Hansen how he intended to resolve the
"improper lane change." (R. 84:31-34, 43-44.) Under those facts, a reasonable person
would not feel free to leave. (See State's Brief at 36-37; R. 84:30 (acknowledging that a
detainee would not feel free to leave before an officer issued a citation or warning).)
In addition, as Officer Huntington returned the documentation to Hansen, Huntington
expanded the scope of the detention without justification: He continued investigative
questioning, and asked about drugs, alcohol, and weapons. Huntington also asked Hansen,
"Do you mind if I check" for such items in the car. (See R. 84:16-18,37-40); Point I, supra.
Also, during the continued detention, a second officer arrived on the scene, with
emergency lights engaged. The second officer stepped out of his car, and stood behind
Hansen's car. (R. 84:14-15, 37.)
Under the circumstances, a reasonable person would not feel free to ignore the
increase in officer presence, and Huntington's questions, particularly in light of the fact that
the officer had not indicated how he intended to resolve the "improper lane change." "When
these factors are combined with a police officer's superior position of authority, any
reasonable person would have felt compelled to submit to the officer's questioning." State
v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d at 771 (on remand from Ohio v. Robinette. 519 U.S. 33, the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that total circumstances failed to support a level-one encounter).
In view of the total circumstances, the court of appeals properly determined that
"Hansen remained seized for Fourth Amendment purposes" when Huntington questioned
him about alcohol, drugs and weapons, and when Huntington requested "consent" to search.
36

Hansen. 2000 UT App 353,1J16.
Next, the state argues that the Fourth Amendment does not "require particular
language, or words at all, to signal the end of a detention." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 3738.) The court of appeals recognized that proposition as well. See Hansen, 2000 UT App
353,H13.
In this case, at the point where Huntington claimed Hansen was free to leave, the total
circumstances that made the encounter a level-two detention were still present and
escalating. That is, from an objective person's perspective, Huntington had not indicated
how he intended to resolve the improper lane change, his emergency lights were still
engaged, he continued to ask investigative-type questions, and a second officer had arrived,
standing behind Hansen's car with emergency lights engaged. (R. 84:14-17, 36-37.)
The conduct did not give Hansen any indication he was free to go, but communicated
the opposite - he was not free to leave ~ and indeed was still at risk for receiving a ticket on
the "improper lane change" — until he answered the additional questions.
Finally, the state attempts to minimize the improper intrusion by claiming the
questions could not have taken "more than a few seconds." (State's Brief of Petitioner at 38.)
That is irrelevant.8 Under the law, a "temporary" or brief detention is improper unless it is

8

That argument also is incorrect. As the facts reflect, the unrelated, unlawful
interrogation facilitated one event after the other, where Hansen answered the questions,
stepped out of the car, submitted to a frisk search, was subjected to a search of the car,
answered more questions, was arrested, and was subjected to a search incident to arrest. (R.
84:19-23, 41-42.) The unrelated, unlawful investigation was intrusive and extensive.
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supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.
[Once] the occupants of the vehicle have satisfied the reasons for the initial stop, the
officer must permit them to proceed." [State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah
App. 1992)] "'Any further temporary detention for investigative questioning after the
fulfillment of the purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth
amendment only #/the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal
activity.'" Id (quoting [State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990)].)
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 659 (bold emphasis added). Also, "[unsupported] by further probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions unrelated to
the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope of the
circumstances that rendered it permissible." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135. "[AJn investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose
of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 49L 500 (1983). At the point where the officer's
reasonable suspicions are allayed, there is no further reason for the stop, and the officer is
required to allow the detainee to leave. Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452. If a detention lasts any
longer than is justified, it is unlawful.
The court of appeals properly ruled the continued detention here was unlawful; it
exceeded the scope of the justification for the stop. See Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, HK8-16.
3. The Officer Failed to Articulate Reasonable Suspicion for the Continued
Detention.
An officer may continue to detain a person beyond the justification for the stop if the
officer has articulated independent facts to support reasonable suspicion of further criminal
activity. See Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453. In this matter, the state does not dispute that
Officer Huntington failed to articulate any basis to justify the continued detention. (See.
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State's Brief of Petitioner; see also R. 84:38.)
Indeed, the state conceded in the court of appeals "that Officer Huntington did not
have a reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious criminal activity to justify the
investigative questions."

Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^f 16. Thus, "Hansen was illegally

detained when Officer Huntington asked him questions that were not reasonably related in
scope to the traffic violation which justified the initial seizure." Id
4. Hansen Is Entitled to Suppression of the Evidence Since the Officer Obtained
"Consent" Through Exploitation of a Prior Illegality.
Even if this Court finds that the consent to search was voluntary, see supra Point I,
herein, the "consent" and seizure of evidence were poisoned by the unlawful detention.
Thus, the evidence discovered in connection with the "consent" must be suppressed. See
Thurman. 842 P.2d at 1262; Arrovo. 796 P.2d at 688-89.
"When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an illegal police
action ..., the prosecution 'has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent
to search' which does not follow police misconduct." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88.
This is because in addition to proving a valid and voluntary consent to search, the
State must also establish the existence of intervening factors which prove that the
consent was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct.
It is well settled that evidence is not subject to exclusion if'"the connection
between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is
"so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'"" The Utah Supreme Court has established
several factors that the reviewing court must examine in evaluating the attenuation
issue: temporal proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in question, the
presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal
misconduct.
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Ham, 910 P.2d at 440-41 (cites omitted), overruled on other grounds, Bisner. 2001 UT 99,
W4-46.
The state has failed to argue "attentuation" in this case. In that regard, the state has
failed to satisfy its "heavier burden" of proof in the matter. See_ Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88.
In addition, the state is prohibited from arguing attenuation in its reply brief.
In considering the "attenuation issue," the record in this case reflects that no time
passed between the continued, illegal detention and the request for consent to search. (R.
84:16, 38.) Also, there were no intervening circumstances between the unlawful conduct
and the "consent." (Id.) Hansen's "consent" was procured during the illegal detention. In
addition, the record reflects that Officer Huntington unlawfully detained Hansen and asked
further questions for the specific purpose of obtaining consent to search the car.
Accordingly, Hansen's consent, even if voluntary, was invalid because it was gained by the
officer's exploitation of his prior illegal conduct. On that basis, all evidence discovered and
seized as a result of the unlawful conduct must be suppressed.
This Court mayfindthat consent was poisoned by the prior illegality. The evidence
obtained in connection therewith must be suppressed.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES
CONCERNING THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY CONSTITUTED COERCION.
As a final matter, the court of appeals considered the totality of the circumstances set
forth above, including the prior illegality, to determine that consent was coerced. While the
"coercion" analysis relates to the voluntariness of the consent, see supra. Point I, herein,
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Hansen has addressed it here, because poison and coercion are intertwined and related.
With regard to coercion, the court of appeals stated the following:
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how
subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting "consent" would be no more than a
pretext for the unjustified police intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is
directed.
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J22 (citing Schneckloth. 412 U.S. 228).
The state takes issue with the court of appeals1 ruling that consent was coerced.
It claims the ruling cannot be upheld for the following reasons: the "presumption against
waiver" standard tainted the coercion analysis; and "detention" may not be a basis for finding
coerced consent. (State's Brief at 29-30.)
With regard to the state's claim regarding the "presumption" standard, it is incorrect.
The court of appeals in this matter specifically considered the totality of the circumstances.
See Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ^}25. That is, the court of appeals looked to the "details of
police conduct and the characteristics of the accused, Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 684[,] which
include 'subtly coerciyepolice questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state
of the person who consents.' Schnecklotk 412U.S.at229." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353422.
Any reference in the "coercion" analysis to the "presumption against waiver" was
inconsequential and constituted dictum. See supra Point I, herein.
With respect to the state's claim that "detention alone cannot by itself render an
otherwise voluntary consent involuntary" (State's Brief of Petitioner at 30), the court of
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appeals did not rely on that factor alone. It looked to the totality of the circumstances,
including the following:
Officer Huntington remained at Hansen's vehicle and continued to ask Hansen
questions, both Officer Huntington and a second armed officer's vehicles remained
parked behind Hansen with their emergency lights flashing, and the second officer
remained outside his vehicle throughout the encounter. Finally, Officer Huntington
did not make any indication to Hansen as to how he intended to handle the improper
lane change before he asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the
vehicle. Officer Huntington merely told Hansen to have his insurance agent call the
Division of Motor Vehicles, and he returned Hansen's license and registration.
Hansen, 2000 UTApp 353415. Also,
[T]he circumstances surrounding the request to search made the request subtly
coercive. Specifically, Officer Huntington had only issued a warning regarding the
lack of insurance and he had not taken any action regarding the improper left turn.
Therefore, a reasonable person would not have felt that their consent, if given, was
a voluntary act of free will because Officer Huntington could have cited Hansen for
the improper lane change if Hansen was uncooperative regarding the search. See
Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)
("[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving
that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily
given....") (emphasis added).
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,1J24.9 The court of appeals' analysis supports coercion. It should
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The state claims the factors set forth in State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah
1980), support that consent was not coerced. (State's Brief at 28.) The Whittenback factors
include the following: "[1] the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; [2]
the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; [3] a mere request to search; [4]
cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and [5] the absence of deception or trick on the part
of the officer." Id
Since "coercion" is assessed under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis, the
Whittenback factors should serve as a starting place for the analysis. See Robinette. 519 U.S.
at 39 (Court refuses to apply rigid tests under the "totality of the circumstances" analysis).
With respect to factors [1] and [2], Officer Huntington testified that as he returned
Hansen's license and registration, a second officer pulled in behind Hansen's car with
emergency lights engaged, and he stepped out of his patrol car to stand behind Hansen's car.
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be affirmed on review. Where the consent is coerced, it is deemed unlawful.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Hansen respectfully requests that this Court affirm
the court of appeals' determination that the state failed to prove valid consent.
SUBMITTED this ^

day of

Cl+^+M^r

2002.

LINDA M. JONES
(J
OTIS STERLING III
Attorneys for Defendant

Both officers were in uniform and armed. The increased intensity supports an exhibition of
authority and force by the officers, under factors [1] and [2].
With respect to factors [3] and [4], Officer Huntington's testimony concerning the
facts supports that Hansen objected to the officer's request to search. See supra. Point I.
Those factors support coercion. And finally, with respect to factor [5], at the time Officer
Huntington requested "consent" to search, he had not indicated to Hansen how he intended
to resolve the "improper lane change." He left the impression that to avoid a citation, Hansen
was required to cooperate. Those facts support manipulation and deception on the part of
Officer Huntington. Under Whittenback and the totality of the circumstances, the record
supports coercion.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

STATED HANSEN

Utair

H35"

Cite as 17 PJd 1135 (UtabApp. 2000)

1587). Moreover, "it is quite clear that a
defendant who procures a judgment against
him upon an indictment to be set aside may
be tried anew upon the same indictment, or
upon another indictment, for the same offense of which he had been convicted." Ball
v. United States, 163 I I S . 662, 665, 16 S.Ct
1192,1195, 41 LuE± 300 (1896).
- f 17 The rationale underlying this policy is
clean " 4[i]t would be a high price indeed for
society to pay were every accused granted
immunity from punishment because of any
defect sufficient to constitute reversible error
in the proceedings leading to conviction/n
Burks, 437 U S . at 15, 98 S.Ct 2141 (quoting
Tateo,.ZTI US. at 466, 34 S.Ct. 1587). Further, ''reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency .. is
a determination that a defendant has been
convicted through a judicial process which is
defective in some fundamental aspect, e.g.,
. . . incorrect instructions." Id ,fWhen this
occurs, the accused has a strong interest in
obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt
free from error, just as society maintains a
valid concern for insuring that die guilty are
punished/' I<L Because we conclude that the
juvenile court committed a procedural error
in utilizing the clear and convmcmg standard
in C.S.B.'s delinquency proceeding, we reverse and remand, noting that sucn a remand
does not violate the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
518 The juvenile court erred when it used
the clear and convincing standard in its written findings for C.S.B.'s delinquency hearing.
Therefore, we reverse. Additionally, we conclude that our authority to remand is clear,
and, in this instance, that remand does not
violate C.S.B.'s Fifth Amendment double
jeopardy protections.
If19 We remand :his case to the juvenile
court for further appropriate written findings, wherein the court 3 instructed to apply
the appropriate standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. The juvenile court may accomplish this in its discretion tnrougn reevaluating the evidence, conducting a new trial, or
other means deemed appropriate. We further direct the juvenile court to explain on

the record its reasons for choosing the direction it takes.
f 20 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Shayne M. HANSEN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 990987-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 14. 2000.
Defendant pleaded guilty in the District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Leslie A. Lewis, J., to illegal possession oi a controlled
substance. He appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: 1) officer's questions about drugs were outside scope of traffic stop, and (2) defendant's consent to search
his car following illegal traffic stop was not
voluntary.
Reversed and remanded.
Greenwood, P.J., filed an opinion concurring in the result
1. Criminal Law <s=»1134(3)
In determining whether a defendant's
consent to a search following illegal police
activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court looks to: (1) the
voluntariness of the consent, and (2) whether
the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. U.S.CA- Const.
Amend. 4.
2. Criminal Law s=1134(3), 1158(2)
A trial court's ultimate conclusion that
consent to search was voiuntarv or involun-
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tary is reviewed on appeal for correctness;
however, its underlying factual findings will
not be set aside unless they are found to be
clearly erroneous. U.S.C.A. Const-Amend. 4.
3. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3)
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop,
an appellate court considers two questions:
whether the officer's action was justified at
its mception, and whether it was reasonably
related m scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference m the first place.
U.S.C.A. Const-Amend. 4.
4. Automobiles e=>349(3)
A police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the
officer's presence. U S.C.A. Const-Amend. 4.
5. Automobiles c=>349(17)
Once a traffic stop is made, the detention must be temporary and ±ast no longer
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4.
6. Automobiles c=>349( 18)
An officer conducting a routine traffic
stop may request a drivers license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check,
and issue a citation, however, once the driver
has produced a valid license and evidence of
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be
allowed to proceed on his wa\, without bemg
subject to further delay by police for additional questioning. U.S.CA- Const-Amend.
4.
7. Automobiles c»349(18)
Following conclusion of traffic stop, investigative questioning that further detains
the driver must be supported oy reasonable
suspicion of more serious criminal activity
U.S.CA Const-Amend. 4.
8. Arrest <3=*S3.5(4)
"Reasonable suspicion" required to validate Terry stop means susDiaon based on
specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facmg the officer
at the time of the stop US.C-A. Const.
Amend. 4.
See puoucauon Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions

9. Arrest <s>68(4)
Once a person is seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not
cease simply because the police formulate an
uncommunicated intention that the seized
person may go on his way; for the seizure to
end, it must be clear to the seized person,
either from the words of an officer or from
the clear import of the circumstances, that
the person is at liberty to go about his business. U.S.CA ConstAmend. 4.
10. Automobiles <s>349(10,18)
During traffic stop, defendant remained
seized under the Fourth Amendment after
police officer returned drivers license and
registration, and accordingly, a reasonable
articulable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity was required to justify subsequent
investigative questioning about drugs, as
such questions were outside scope of jutial
stop, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not believe that he was free to
leave, where officer remained at the car and
asked questions, a second police vehicle was
present, and officer did not address one -of
the reasons for the initial stop. U.S C.A.
ConstAmend. 4;
U CA.1953. 58-378(2)(a)(i)
11. Searches and Seizures <s>182
A defendant's consent to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met: (1) the consent was
given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not
obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality U.S.CA. Const-Amend. 4.
12. Searches and Seizures <s=>194
It is the state's burden to prove that a
consent to search was voluntarily given; if
the state fails to meet this burden, the evidence is deemed inadmissible against the
defendant U.S.CA. ConstAmend. 4.
13. Criminal Law <s=>1134(2)
In determining wnether consent to
search was voluntarily given, an appellate
court will look to the totality of all the circumstances. U.S.CA- ConstAmend. 4.

STATE v. HANSEN
Ctt*aal7 PJd 1135 (UBhApp. 2000)

14. Searches and Seizures <3»182
Defendant's consent to search his car for
drugs following illegal traffic stop was not
freely and voluntarily given; officer was coercive and a reasonable person would not have
felt free to ignore the request, as officer only
addressed one of the two reasons for the stop
when the request was made, which would
indicate to defendant that he could be ated
for the other reason if he was uncooperative.
U.S.C.A. ConstJjnend. 4; U.CJL1953, 58S7-8(2Xa)(i).

Linda M. Jones and Otis Sterling, EH, Salt
Lake Legal Defender Association, Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
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Before GREENWOOD, P.J., DAVIS and
ORME, JJ
OPINION
DAVIS, Judge:
111 Defendant Shayne Michael Hansen
(Hansen) appeals his conviction for illegal
possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998).
BACKGROUND
112 On December 11, 1998, Officer Bruce
Huntington of the Midvale City Police Department was driving behind Hansen. Officer Huntington initiated a computer check of
Hansen's vehicle with the Utah Division of
Motor Venicles. While Officer Huntington
waited for the results of the .computer check,
he observed Hansen make an improper left
turn.1 After Officer Huntington observed
the turn, the computer check revealed that
Hansen's car was uninsured Due to these
violations, Officer Huntington decided-tq stop
1, Hansen completed his left turn bv entering the
right lane rather than the extreme left-hand
lane, presumably in vioianon of Utah Code Ann
J 4J-6-oo11998)
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the vehicle, and he activated his overhead
emergency lights. Hansen pulled off the
road and stopped m the pariang lot of a
convenience store.
Officer Huntington
parked directly behind Hansen.2
13 Officer Huntington, dressed m uniform and carrying a sidearm, exited his patrol car and confronted Hansen. Officer
Huntington told Hansen that he stopped him
because of the improper lane change and lack
of insurance. Hansen admitted that the did
not have any insurance and stated that he
could not afford insurance. Officer Huntington requested Hansen's driver's license and
registration, and returned to his patrol car to
run a computer check on Hansen. After
approximately five minutes, the computer
check revealed that Hansen's license was
valid, and Hansen did not have any outstanding warrants. Officer Huntington then exited his patrol car and returned to Hansen.
While Officer Huntington was walking oack
to Hansen s vehicle, another officer pullea
into the pariang lot This second officer
parked next to Officer Huntington's car. got
out of his patrol car, and remained oy the
patrol cars The emergency lights on both
patrol cars were flashing, and they remained
flasning throughout the encounter
14 Upon returning to Hansen s vemcie.
Officer Huntington told Hansen that state
law required him to have automobile insurance, and Hansen needed to have an insurance agent mail proof of insurance to the
Division of Motor Vehicles Officer Huntington did not say anything to Hansen regarding the improper lane change Officer
Huntington then returned Hansen's drivers
license and registration, however. Officer
Huntington did not tell Hansen that ie was
free to leave. Instead, Officer Huntington
asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in his venicle. Hansen replied
that he did not have any such items. Officer
Huntington then asked Hansen. "Do you
mind if I cneck?"3 Officer Huntington :esu2. It is not clear from the record wnether Officer
Huntinston impeded Hansen s abiiin to drive otf
when he parited behmd Hansen
3. Officer Huntington testified with commendable
candor that It is my practice to ask tnem ror
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fled that Hansen responded 'Tes." 4
115 Officer Huntington then told Hansen
and his passenger to step out of the car, and
Officer Huntington directed them to stand
next to the other officer. Officer Huntington
conducted a search of the car where he found
a homemade billy club and a marijuana pipe
on the floor of the driver's area of the car.
Officer Huntington arrested Hansen and
searched him incident to the arrest. During
the search of Hansen, Officer Huntington
found a substance he suspected to be methamphetamine. Hansen was later charged
with possession of a controlled substance m
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1998), and unlawful possession of
drug parapnemaiia m violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998).
116 Prior to trial. Hansen moved to suppress evidence ootained m the searches,
claiming tnat Officer Hunungton illegally detamed him and that ne did not voluntarily
consent to the searcii of his car The trial
court denied Hansen's motion to suppress,
concluding that the evidence was lawfully
seized oecause u[a]t the time consent was
obtained, there was no seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes oecause detendant was
free to leave,' and "[defendant's consent to
search was freely and voluntarily given."
Hansen later entered a conditional guilty
plea to unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. Hansen now appeals the trial
court's denial of his motion to suppress.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1,2] H7 Hansen alleges that the trial
court erred m denying his motion to suppress
because Officer Hunungton s search violated

his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically,
Hansen argues that his consent to search
was not valid because it was obtained
through Officer Huntington's exploitation of
an illegal seizure, and his consent was not
voluntarily given.5
[Bjecause the determination of whether an
encounter with law enforcement officers
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment Ui "calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the
next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police," '" such determination is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness.
Salt Lake City v Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 18,
998 P.2d 274 (citations omitted). Similarly,
the trial court's ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or involuntary is reviewed
for correctness. See State v Thurmaru 846
?2d 1256, 1271 (Utan 1993). However,
"[T]he trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set aside unless they are
found to be clearly erroneous.'1 Id.
ANALYSIS
I. Nature of the police encounter
*8 Hansen argues that the trial court
erred in its conclusion that, at the tame the
consent was obtained, there was no seizure
for Fourth Amendment purposes because
Hansen was free to leave
The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guarantees the "right
of the people to be secure m their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." UJSL
Gonst. amend. IV The United States 3u-

consent bv stating Do vou have anv alcohol
weapons or drugs in the vehicle 5
ind if thev
sav no I say Well ao vou mind if * check 5
4.

The record indicates that Officer Huntington
was unsure about Hansen s response For example during ooth direct and cross examination
Officer Hunungton testified Jiat Hansen responded ves to the question Do \ou mind if I
check5
However in ooth jistances the court
intenecteo bv asking Officer 4untington f Hansen said ves he minded
Officer Hunungton
responded to tne court s quesuons bv stating that
Hansen said ves I could have consent. .However Officer Hunungton later admitted thai he

did not remember Hansen s exact response regarding his question— T)o vou mind if I check*"
5.

In determining whether a defendant s consent
to a search following illegal police a c t i v i t y ^
valid under the Fourth Amendment we took to
d) the voluntariness of the consent and fii)
whether the consent was obtained bv police expioitauon ot the prior illegality See Stale v
Thurman 346 P 2d 1256'1262 (Utah 1993)
Therefore we begin our analvsis with the issue of
whether Officer Huntington s seizure was illegal
and then analvze whether Hansen s consent was
voluntary
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preme Court has held that "stopping an
automobile and detaining its occupants
constituted] a seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, "even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief." Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct 1391,
59 LJ3(L2d 660 (1979). Thus, u[a]lthough
a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one
does not lose the protection of the Fourth
Amendment while m an automobile/'
State v. Schlosser. 774 PJ2d 1132, 1135
(Utah 1989) (citation omitted).
State u Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah
1994) (alteration m original).
[3,4] 19 "In reviewing the legality of a
traffic stop, we consider two questions:
<
[W]hether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and wnether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place.'"
State v. PatefieUL 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah
CtApp.1996) (alteration m original) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20. 88 S.Ct 1868,
1879, 20 L.EcL2d 889 (1968)), accord Lopez
873 P.2d at 1131-32. With respect to the
first question, a ponce officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a venicle if the stop
is "incident to a traffic violation committed in
the officers' presence " Staze v Talbot 792
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah CtApp.1990); see also
State v MarsnalL 791 P.2d 880, 881-83
(Utah CtApp.1990), State v Sierra. 754 P.2d
972, 975 (Utan CtApp.1988)

stop.'" Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting
Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct
1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Both "[t]he
length and scope of the detention must be
'strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763
(Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 1920, 88 S.Ct 1868). Therefore,
[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic
stop may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, conduct a computer
check, and issue a citation. United States
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.
1988). However, once the driver has produced a valid license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be
allowed to proceed on his way, without
being subject to further delay by police for
additional questioning " IdState v Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah
CtApp.1990).
"Investigative questioning
that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion
means suspicion based on specific, articulable
facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the
stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.

[9] 112 Here, Hansen claims that he
was illegally seized at the time the alleged
consent was obtained because Officer Huntington engaged in investigative questioning
without reasonaole suspicion of more serious
1! 10 Here, Hansen was seized by Officer criminal activity. The State counters that
Huntington when ne was stopped for the when Officer Huntington gave Hansen a
improper lane change and lack of insurance. warning and returned his license and regisIt is clear that Officer Huntington was justi- tration, the encounter between Officer Huntfied in seizing Hansen because Hansen com- ington and Hansen ceased to be a seizure
mitted two traffic violations in the officer's under the Fourth Amendment.
presence. Consequently, Hansen does not
Under Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct
dispute the legality of the initial stop and the
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progefirst part of the Terry inquiry is not at issue.
ny, there are three levels of police-citizen
encounters, each requiring a different de[5-8] U 11 The second auestion in regree of justification under the Fourth
viewing the legahtv of a traffic stop is whethAmendment. State v Munseru 821 P.2d
er the stoo was reasonaDlv elated in scope
13, 15 n. 1 (Utah ApD.1991), cert denied.
to the trflffir violation wnicn justified it in the
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) The first level
first place. See PaiefieuL 927 P.2d at 657.
"Once a traffic stoD is made, the detention
occurs when an officer approaches and
"must be. temporary and last no longer than
questions a suspect An officer may stop
is necessaryxo effectuate the purpose of the
and question a person at any time so long
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as that person "is not detained against his
[or her] will" Id The next level is
reached when an officer temporarily seizes
a person. In order to legally effect a
temporary seizure, the officer must have
"articulable suspicion" that the suspect has
or is about to commit a crime, and the
detention must be limited in scope. Id
The third level is arrest, which requires
probable cause for the officer to believe
that a crime has been or is about to be
committed. Id.

circumstances, that the person is at liberty
to go about his or her business.
Higgins. 884 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added).

[10] 113 In the present case, the trial
court concluded that the detention did not
exceed the scope of the traffic stop and that
at the time Hansen consented to the search,
there was no seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes. We disagree. The record clearly
indicates that neither the words of Officer
Huntington nor the clear import of the circumstances would have communicated to a
Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 PJ2d 1003,1006 reasonable person that the person was free
(Utah CtApp.1996) (alteration in original). to decline the officers requests, terminate
The Supreme Court of Utah has declared: the encounter, and go about his or her business. Although Officer Huntington returned
Not every encounter between a police offi- Hansen's drivers license and registration,
cer and a citizen is a seizure. A person is given the surrounding circumstances, this act
seized under the Fourth Amendment alone would not have communicated to a
when, considering the totality of the cir- reasonable person that he or sne was free to
cumstances, the police conduct would have leave. See United States v. Saridovai, 29
communicated to a reasonaole person that F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir.1994) tu In the context
the person was not free to decline the of traffic stops this Circuit has adopted as an
officer's requests or otherwise terminate indicium of a seizure the officers taking of
the encounter and go aoout his or her necessary documentation (drivers license
business.
and vehicle registration) from a dnver, and
we have also considered as a necessary (but
State v. Higgins, 384 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah
not always sufficient) condition of the termi1994) (internal citations omitted).
nation of that seizure the officers return of
"). For example, afIllustrating this standard, the United such documentation.
States Supreme Court noted: "Examples ter Officer Huntington returned Hansen's liof circumstances that mignt indicate a sei- cense and registration. Officer Huntington
zure, even where the person did not at- did not say anything to Hansen that would
tempt to leave, would be the threatening have indicated that Hansen was free to go.
presence of several officers, the display of We recognize that an officer is not required
a weapon by an officer, some physical to inform a detainee that they are free to go,
touching of the person of the citizen, or the see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117
use of language or tone of voice indicating S.Ct. 417, 421, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); howthat compliance with the officer's request ever, such a statement would have supported
the trial court's conclusion that Hansen was
might be compelled."
not seized at the time he gave consent See
State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah United States v. Torres-Guevara. 147 F.3d
CtApp.1996) (quoting United Stales v. Men- 1261, 1265 (10th Cir.1998) (stating defendant
denhall 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct 1870, was not seized for Fourth Amendment pur1877, 64 L.£d.2d 497 (1980)). Furthermore, poses, in part, because officers told defen[o]nce a person is seized for Fourth dant she was free to leave): United States v.
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not Gregory, 79 F.3d 973. 979 (10th Cir.1996)
cease simply oecause the police formulate ("Although not prerequisites, in determining
an uncommunicated intention that the whether consent is voluntary when given folseized person may go on his or her way. lowing the return of defendant's documents,
For the seizure to end. it must ve clear to we IOOK at sucn factors as wnether the officer
the seized person, either from the words of informed the defendant that he was free 3D
an officer or from the clear import of the leave the scene or that he could refuse to
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give consent"); United States v McSwavru
29 F.3d 558, 563 (10th Cir.1994) (same).
114 Not only did Officer Huntington fail
to communicate to Hansen that he was free
to leave, the question that Officer Huntington
asked Hansen—"Do you have any drugs, alcohol or weapons in the car?"—communicated the message that Hansen was not free to
leave. This question, although not directly
accusatory, was clearly investigatory, indicating that Officer Huntington suspected that
Hansen was engaged in some sort of illegal
activity. Therefore, investigatory questions
such as the one asked here actually cut
against the proposition that a reasonable person would feel that the initial seizure has
ended and that he or she is now free to
terminate the encounter Cf Sandoval 29
F 3d at 542 (stating that the crucial predicate
to a voluntary police citizen encounter was
missing because u[a]t no point did the nature
of those inquiries Laoout defendant's drug
mvolvement] change the climate so that the
reasonaole listener would Mew participation
m the exchange as ireeiy termlnable,,),
Washington v Soto-Garcia 68 WasLApp
20, 841 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 J992) (holding
that progressive intrusion into defendant's
privacy was of such a nature that a reasonable person would not Deheve that he or she
was free to end the encounter)

especially the fact that Officer Huntington
had not addressed one of the reasons for the
initial stop, a reasonable person would not
have felt tree to terminate the encounter and
proceed on his or her way.
1116 Due to the factors discussed above,
we find that Hansen remained seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes when, and because, Officer Huntington asked him whether
there was alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the
vehicle. Likewise Hansen was seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes when Officer
Huntington requested consent to search the
car. The State concedes that Officer Huntington did not have a reasonable articulable
suspicion of more serious criminal activity to
justify the investigative questions Therefore, Hansen was illegally detained when Officer Huntington asked mm questions that
were not reasonably related m scope to the
traffic violation which justified the initial seizure. See United States i Walker 933 F 2d
812, 816 (10th Or 1991) 'holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under Fourth
Amendment when officer detained him to ask
questions unrelated in scoDe to the reasons
that justified the initial traffic stop)
H. Voluntariness of Consent

117 We now turn to the issue of whether
Hansen s consent to searcn was valid despite
the illegality of Officer Huntington s seizure.
H 15 In addition to Officer Huntington's
A warrantless search is a per se Fourth
words, the clear import of the circumstances
Amendment violation unless the State can
m the present case would not have indicated
establish one of the " 'few specifically esto a reasonable person that he or she was
tablished
and well-delineated exceptions.'"
free to leave. Officer Huntington remained
State
v
Arroyo,
796 P.2d 684. 687 (Utah
at Hansen's vehicle and continued to ask
1990)
(quoting
Katz
v United States, 389
Hansen questions, both Officer Huntington
U.S.
347,
357,
88
S.Ct
507. 514,19 L.EcL2d
and a second armed officer's vehicles re576
(1967)
(citations
omitted)), accord
mained parked bemnd Hansen with their
State
v.
Sepulveaa
842
?M
913, 918 (Utah
emergency lights flashing, and the second
App.1992).
One
of
the
clearly
established
officer remained outside his venicle throughexceptions
is
a
consent.
Arroyo
796 P.2d
out the encounter Finally, Officer Huntingat
687,
Sewdveda,
842
P.2d
at
918
ton did not make any indication to Hansen as
to how he intended to handle the improper State v Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utan Ct
lane change before he asked Hansen if he App.1996).
had any alcohol weapons, or drugs in the
[11-13] «118 U[A] defendant's consent to
vehicle. Officer Huntington mereiv told a searcn following illegal Dohce activity is
Hansen to have his insurance agent call the valid under the Fourth Amendment only if
Division of Motor Vemcies, ana he returned both of the following tests are met. u; The
Hansen s license and registration. Because consent was given voluntarily, and \W the
of the clear import of the circumstances, consent was not obtained DV police exploita-
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tion of the prior illegality." State v. Tkur-•maru 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utan 1993); seee
also State v Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684. 688 (Utah1
1990). u It is the State's burden to prove that1
a consent was voluntarily given
If the
State fails to meet this burden, the evidence
~
is deemed inadmissible against the defendant," Ham, 910 P.2d at 439: accord Thurman, 846 ?2d at 1263; State v. Robinson,
797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah CtApp.1990). Thiss
court has adopted the following analytical1
framework to determine whether the State
has met its burden of proving that consentt
was voluntarily given:
'(1) There must be clear and positive testi-"
mony that the consent was ^equivocal
and specific" and "freely ana intelligently
given", (2) the government must prove>
consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when{
evaluating these first two standards, we]]
indulge every reasonade presumptioni
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing;
evidence that such ngnts were waived/
Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (citations omitted)
|
(alterations in original)
In determining
whether consent was voluntarily given we[
will look to the "totality of all the circumstances " Scnnecicloth v Buszamonte, 412!
U.S. 218. 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed2dI
854 (1973), accord Ham 910 P2d at 439.
[14] * 19 As stated aoove, Hansen was;
illegally seized at the time Officer Huntington requested consent to search Hansen's
vehicle. Therefore, for the evidence discovered m the search to be admissible, Hansen's1
consent if given, must have been voluntary,
and the consent must not have been obtained
by police exploitation of the pnor illegality.
The trial court concluded that Hansen's "consent to search was freely and voluntarily
given " 6 We disagree for the following reasons.

and freely and intelligently given). Sperifically, the following colloquies took place:
Q. [Prosecutor] And then you asked, "Do
you mind if I check?"
A. [Officer Huntangton] Uh-huh.
Q. And what was his response to that
question?
A. He said yes.
Q. [Court] Yes, he minded?
A- Yes, I could have consent to search.

Q. [Defense Counsel] Do you recall speafically what you said to him?
A. Not specifically.
Q. Do you have any idea?
A. I would imagine that I stated: "Do
you have any alconol, drugs or weapons m
the vehicle?"
Q. He said no?
A. He said no. Do you mind if I check?
Q. Okay.
A. And then he said yes.
Q. [Court] He said?
Q. [Defense Counsel] He says yes?
A. [Officer Huntington] Yes.
Q. [Court] Do you mind if I check—and
he says yes7
A. Well, do you mind if I check and then
yes, he gave me consent. Sorry.

Q. [Defense Counsel] What did he say?
A. What did he say?
Q. Yeah.
A. I don't recall exactly other than it was
consent
Q. So you don't recall his exact words?
A. Not exactly.

120 First, Officer Huntington's testimony was neither clear nor positive regarding
Hansen s response to his second question.
See Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (requiring testimony that consent was unequivocal ana specific

1121 Officer Huntington testified twice
that he asked Hansen, "Do .you mind if I
check?" and Hansen responaed, "Yes-" The
court clearly realized the import of officer
Huntington s testimony and interrupted the
attorneys in an effort to cianfy Officer finnt-

6. The trial court did not majce anv conclusion
regarding the second tactor—wnetner the consent was obtained bv police expioitauon of the

pnor illegality—because the tnal court concluded, erroneously that there was no illegality preceding defendant s alleged consent to search- 1 J
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ington's testimony. However, Officer Huntinto account both the details of police conington's responses to the court's questions
duct and the characteristics of the accused,
were conclusory rather than "dear and posiArroyo, 796 P.2d at 684[,] which include
tive testimony" that Hansen's reply was
"subtly coercive police questions, as well as
u
*unequivocal and specific'" Harru 910 P.2d
the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
at 439 (citations omitted). Moreover, Officer
the person who consents." Schneckloth.
Huntington admitted that he did not recall
412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 2049.
Hansen's exact words. Therefore, we hold
that the trial court's determination that the State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah
testimony was clear and positive that Han- CtApp.1990) (emphasis added).
sen's response was unequivocal and specific
H 23 The present case is quite similar to
was incorrect. To the extent its determina- Ohio v. Robinette. 80 Ohio St3d 234, 685
tion amounted to a finding of fact, it was N.E.2d 762 (1997). In Robinette. an officer
clearly erroneous.
stopped the defendant for a speeding viola122 The Ham analytical framework re- tion. See id at 764. The officer issued the
quires us to next address whether Hansen's defendant a verbal warning for the speeding
response was freely and intelligently given violation, and returned the defendant's drivand obtained without duress or coercion, ex- er's license. See id The officer then said to
press or implied7 See Harru 910 P.2d at 439. the defendant. "One question before you get
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments gone [sic]: are you earning any illegal conrequire that a consent not be coerced, by traband in your car? Any weapons of any
explicit or implicit means, by implied kind, drugs, anything like that?" Id When
threat or covert force. For. no matter how defendant responded that he did not have
subtly the coercion was applied, the result- any contraband in the car, the officer asked if
ing "consent" would be no more than a he could search the vehicle. See id The
pretext for the unjustified police intrusion defendant answered "yes" to the officer's
against which the Fourth Amendment is request. See id On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, see Ohio
directed.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 22S. 93 S.Ct. 2041. v. Robinette. 519 U.S. 33. 117 S.Ct. 417. 136
In examining all the surrounding circum- L.EdJ2d 347 (1996), the Supreme Court of
stances to determine if in fact the consent Ohio looked at the totality of the circumto search was coerced, a court must take stances to determine whether a reasonable
7.

Our colleague suggests that our analysis should
conclude with our ruling that the trial court
incorrectly determined that the testimony was
clear and positive that Hansen s response to the
officers second question was unequivocal and
specific.
While we may elect to forego further analysis
in cases where one or more decided issues may
arguably be dispositive, we are not obliged to do
so. Indeed. Lhere are numerous circumstances
under wmch we mav elect to reach an issue that
arguablv need not be addressed in order to resolve the case. Our election to treat moot issues
which are of significant public import and likely
to recur, even wnere the issue is not likely to
evade judicial review, rinds a particulariv appropriate analog JI this case See, e.° , In re S.L..
1999 UT App 390, " 40 995 P 2d 17 (reaching
merits of issue capable of mdicial review because
it was of significant puohc import and was likely
to recur) cert aeniea. 4 P 3d 1239 (Utan 2000);
W. di G. Co. \ Redevelopment Agency, 302 P.2d
755, 765 (Utan C L A D P . 1 9 9 0 ) > addressing issue,
even Ltiougn otner issue dispositive, because "it
is or wide concern
it sigmficandy affects the

public interest, and it is likely to recur in a
similar manner '); cf. State v. Rodnguez-Lopi.
954 P.2d 1290, 1294 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1998)
(Davis. J., concurring) (addressing issue because
"{Yjhis situation is somewhat analogous to a deterrmnauon of whetner to reacn a moot issue ').
We mav also analyze an issue to enable the
supreme court to address that issue on review.
Cf. State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d 598. O00 (Utah
1998) {strung that issue was outside scope of
review because court of appeals did not reach
issue). We may also wish to provide guidance
for further proceedings. See, e.g.. State v. James,
819 P2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are
fullv briefed on appeal and are likeiv to be presented on remand should be addressed by [an
appellate] court. '). State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100,
108 (Utah 1988) (addressing issue m interest of
judicial economv, since issue likeiv to recur, to
provide trial court with guidance;: Atlas Corv \.
Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 P 2d 225. 231 (Utan 1987)
(same); Vizaie v Belmont Springs, 916 P 2d 359
363 (Utah C;.App.i996> (addressing issue in interest of judicial economy, even tnough case decided on other grounds;.
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person would have believed that they could any action regarding the improper left turn.
refuse to answer further auesuons and leave Therefore, a reasonable person would not
See Robinette. 685 N.EJd at 769. The court have felt that their consent, if given, was a
then ruled that
voluntary act of tree will because Officer
[the officer's] words did not give Robinette Huntington could have ated Hansen for the
any indication that he was iree to go, but improper lane change if Hansen was uncooprather implied just the opposite—that Ro- erative regarding the search.3 See Florida
binette was not free to go until he an- u Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497. 103 S.Ct 1319,
swered [the officer's] additional questions. 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ("[W]here the
The timing of [the officers] immediate validity of a search rests on consent, the
transition from giving RoDinette the warn- State has the burden of proving that the
ing for speeding into questioning regard- necessary consent was obtained and that it
") (eming contraband and the request to search was freely and voluntarily given
is troubling
"The transition between phasis added).
detention and a consentual [sic] exchange
1125 Officer Huntington did not provide
can be so seamless that the untrained eye
clear and positive testimony that Hansen's
may not notice that it has occurred. The alleged consent was unequivocal and specific.
undetectability of that transition may be Furthermore, in looking at the totality of the
used by police officers to coerce citizens circumstances, it is clear that officer Huntinto answering questions tnat they need ington s request was coercive, and a reasonnot answer, or to allow a search of a able person would not have felt free to ignore
vehicle that they are not legally obligated Officer Huntington's request Therefore, Deto allow"
When these factors are cause we indulge every reasonaole presumpcombmed with a ponce officers superior tion against the waiver of fundamental conposition of authority any reasonable per- stitutional rights, see Ham. 910 P 2d at 439,
son would have ielt compelled to submit to we hold that the trial court erred in concludthe officers questioning
ing that Hansen s consent was freely and
Id. at 770-71 (citation omitted) (emphasis m voluntarily given.9
original)
1124 Here, as in Roomette the intrusive
CONCLUSION
and suspicious questions asked by the officer,
combmed with the fact that the questions
126 We conclude that the trial court
were asked immediately after the defendant erred in denymg Hansen s monon to supwas detained, indicate that a reasonable per- press the evidence obtained in the search of
son would not have ielt free go until they Hansen's car Hansen was illegally detained
answered the additional questions. Further- when Officer Huntington asked for consent
more, althougn the questions were not ex- to search Hansen's vehicle. Officer Huntpressly coercive, the circumstances surround- ington did not provide clear and positive tesing the request to search made the request timony that Hansen's alleged consent was
subtly coercive. Specifically, Officer Hunt- unequivocal and specific and freely and intelington had only issued a warning regarding ligently given. In addition, the State did not
the lack of insurance and ne had not taken prove that Hansen's alleged consent was giv8.

It is irrelevant that Hansen mav have known
that the searcn would have turned up contraband therebv reducing the coercive nature of the
situation d e Hansen should have Dreterred the
citation over the searcn) because the
reasonable person test presupposes an innocent per
son
Flonaav Bostick 501 L S 429 437 111
S O . 2382 2388 115 L. Ed 2d 389 (1991) (em
phasis in original) accord Micmgan v Chesternut 4 8 6 U S ~ 5 o 7 574 '08 S O . 1975 1979-80
100 L~Ed.2d 565 U988) ( This reasonable person standard
ensures tnat the scope of

Fourth Amenament protecnon does not vary
with the state or mind of tne paracuiar individual
being aoproacned.')
9

Because we conclude that Hansen did not voluntanlv consent to the searcn we do not address
whether the consent was ootained bv police expioitanon of the prior dlegalicv See Tkurman
846 P 2d at 1262 ('If the court determines that
the consent was not voluntary no rurther analysis is required the consent is invalid anrijhe
proffered evidence-must be excluded.')

STATE v. HORROCKS
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en without duress or coennon. Consequently, Officer Huntington's search of Hansen's
vehicle violated Hansen's rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the search.

Anthony W. Schofield, J., demed motion, and
defendant entered conditional guilty pleas to
use or possession of psilocyoin and use or
possession of marijuana. Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals. Greenwood. P.J.. neld
that: (1) jeopardy attached wnen justice court
1 27 Reversed and remanded for further accepted defendant's pleas to misdemeanor
offenses; (2) manifest necessity existed to
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
allow nnsplea and dismissal of misdemeanor
128 I CONCUR GREGORY K. ORME, charges, such that prosecution could proceed
on new information without violating double
Judge.
jeopardy.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge
Affirmed.
(concurring in result):
H29 I agree with my colleagues that
Hansen was illegally detained when the officer asked for permission to search his vehicle
and conducted that search. I also agree that
the trial court erred in determining that
Hansen gave his clear and unecnuvocal consent to the search. Having made that determination, I would not undertake to analyze
whether Hansen's non-consent was ootained
without duress or coercion. I would therefore concur in the conclusion that the trial
court erred in denying Hansen's motion to
suppress.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Blaine HORROCKS, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 990411-CA.
Gourt of Appeals of Utah.
Jan. 5, 200L
Defendant moved to dismiss felony
charges on ground that they were barred by
double jeopardy Decause of his pleas in "the
Justice Court to various misdemeanor offenses ansmg out of same incident. The
Fourth District Court, Provo Department,

1. Criminal Law <3=>1134(8)
A trial court's decision to grant or deny
a motion to dismiss presents a question of
law, which is reviewed for correctness.
2. Criminal Law 0260.13
Defendant exhausted his right to appeal
from justice court's dismissal of misdemeanor
offenses m favor of subsequent felony information when he appealed to district court
under statute providing for trial de novo, and
he had no right thereafter to appeal district
court's decision affirming the dismissal.
U.CA1953, 78-5-120.
3. Judgment c=>642
Issue of whether double jeopardy barred
State's reprosecution of defendant on felony
charges was not barred on oasis of res judicata or other legal principles by earlier appeal of justice court's dismissal of misdemeanor offenses ansmg out of same incident,
where issue in that case was whether signed
final order was ever issued on defendant's
pleas and thus wftether those charges could
be dismissed.
4. Double Jeopardy o>57
Jeopardy attaches when a court accepts
a guilty plea: entry of the plea, rather than
the actual imposition of the sentence, is the
critical moment for determining jeopardy.
U.S.C-A ConstAmend. 5.
5. Criminal Law <3=>274(3.1)
Double Jeopardy <5=>57
Jeopardy attaches once a plea is accepted by the court, but the plea can be set aside
upon a showing of manifest necessity before

ADDENDUM B

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM C
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-V-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.991903645FS

SHAYNE M. HANSEN,
Defendant.

Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally, filed in the aboveentitled matter, came on for hearing before the Court on August 4, 1999. Defendant was
present with his counsel, Otis Sterling HI, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and the
State of Utah was represented by N. M. D'Alesandro, Deputy District Attorney.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence gathered as a result of a warrantless search
of a vehicle that defendant was driving, arguing that the search was beyond the scope of
defendant's detention for a traffic stop and that the defendant had not given his voluntary
consent for officers to search the vehicle.

Having considered defendant's motion, the sworn testimony of Midvale City
Police Officer Bruce Huntington, and oral argument, and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendant is charged by Information with Unlawful Possession of a

Controlled Substance (methamphetamine), a Third Degree Felony, and Unlawful
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class B Misdemeanor.
2.

The Information is based on a traffic stop that occurred on December 11,

1998, at 20 South Main Street, in Midvale, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
3.

On that date, Midvale Police Officer Bruce Huntington was on patrol,

alone, in a marked patrol car.
4.

Officer Huntington had been a Midvale police officer for a year and a half

and had a total of three years of law enforcement experience.
5.

At approximately 11:15 p.m. on December 11, 1998, Officer Huntington

was southbound on Holden Street in Midvale behind another car.
6.

At the intersection of Holden Street and Center Street, the car that Officer

Huntington was following made a left turn onto Center Street in order to travel east.
7.

Holden and Center Streets are public highways.

8.

At the intersection of Holden Street and Center Street, vehicles turning

east onto Center Street are required to enter the inside traffic lane.

9.

The car that Officer Huntington was following turned into the outside

eastbound traffic lane of Center Street.
10.

Officer Huntington used his laptop computer to check the license plate

number on the car he was following.
11.

Officer Huntington retrieved the computer record on the license plate

number and found no insurance information listed.
12.

Officer Huntington stopped the other car by turning on his overhead

emergency lights.
13.

Both cars stopped at 20 South Main Street.

14.

Officer Huntington approached the other car on foot.

15.

There were two male occupants in the car.

16.

The driver was identified as Shayne M. Hansen, the defendant.

17.

Officer Huntington informed the defendant why he had been stopped and

requested his driver's license, registration, and insurance information.
18.

Defendant produced a driver's license and registration, but said that he

could not afford insurance.
19.

Officer Huntington returned to his patrol car and checked the status of

defendant's driver's license and whether defendant was the subject of warrants.
20.

The driver's license was determined to be valid and there were no

outstanding warrants.

21.

Officer Huntington approached defendant, returned his driver's license

and registration, and warned him that he had to obtain insurance for his car and to carry
proof of insurance in the car.
22.

At the time defendant was warned, he had been detained less than ten

minutes.
23.

From an objective viewpoint, defendant was clearly free to leave after his

documents had been returned to him.
24.

After returning the defendant's documents to him, Officer Huntington

asked defendant two brief questions.
25.

Officer Huntington first asked defendant whether he had any drugs,

weapons, or paraphernalia in his car.
26.

Defendant told the officer he did not have any drugs, weapons, or

paraphernalia in the car.
27.

Officer Huntington then asked defendant whether he could search his car.

28.

The officer's question was permissive and did not suggest that he had a

right to search.
29.

Defendant clearly and unequivocally said "yes," permitting the search.

30.

No appreciable time passed while the officer requested and received

permission to search.
31.

At the time Officer Huntington requested permission to search, defendant

was not in custody and had not been cited or told to exit the vehicle.

32.

There was no coercive conduct on the part of the officer to secure

defendant's consent to search.
33.

Officer Huntington's demeanor, voice, and stature were not coercive in

34.

At the time Officer Huntington sought defendant's consent for a search,

nature.

there were no other officers surrounding the defendant.
35.

Officer Huntington did not inform the defendant that he was free to leave

or that he could deny his request to search.
36.

Officer Huntington asked both occupants to step out of the vehicle.

37.

Officer Huntington searched the interior of the car and found contraband.

38.

Defendant was arrested.

39

During a search of defendant incident to the arrest, Officer Huntington

found suspected methamphetamine.
40.

Officer Huntington's testimony was credible.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Given the factual findings, the most compelling legal precedent is Ohio v.

Robinette. 519 U. S. 33, 136 L. Ed. 2d 347, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
2.

The officer had probable cause to stop the car and detain the occupants for

a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence.

3.

The stop of the vehicle and detention of the occupants were also justified

by a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was uninsured.
4.

In the totality of circumstances, defendant was lawfully stopped and

detained.
5.

The detention of the defendant did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop.

6.

At the time consent was obtained, there was no seizure for Fourth

Amendment purposes because defendant wasfreeto leave.
7.

Although the officer had no warrant, he searched the car pursuant to

consent given by the defendant, who had apparent authority and control over the vehicle.
8.

Defendant's consent to search wasfreelyand voluntarily given.

9.

There was no illegality preceding defendant's consent to search that

rendered the consent involuntary.
10.

Defendant's car was lawfully searched.

11.

The evidence wasjawfully seized

DATED this
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day of _
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_, 1999.
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Approved as to form^ _".
Otis Sterling III
Attorney for Defendant

Nyli^

i/

LESLIE A. LEWIS, Judge

SEP

DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
N. M. D'ALESANDRO, Bar No. 4818
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
-V-

Case No. 991903645FS

SHAYNE M. HANSEN,
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis

Defendant.

The Court having reviewed the evidence and the law, having made findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and being fully advised of the premises, hereby denies
defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally.
DATED this

/S day of

SlLjbA-

, 1999.

LESLIE A. EEWIS,"Judge
Approved as to form:

Otis Sterling III
Attorney for Defendant
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